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ABSTRACT 
COHORT AND GENDER DIFFERENCES AND THE MARRIAGE WAGE PREMIUM: 
FINDINGS FROM THE NLSY79 AND THE NLSY97 
February 2015 
MISUN LIM 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SEOUL 
M.A., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Michelle J. Budig  
 
Past research has established a marital wage premium among men, and more recently, among 
women of the baby boom generation. It is unknown whether: 1) the marriage premium holds 
among more recent cohorts of men and women, 2) it differs by intensity of work hours 
among husbands and wives, and 3) if cohabiters receive wage bonuses. Using fixed-effects 
models and data from the 1979-1989 and 1997-2010 waves of the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97), this paper compares cohort differences in the 
gendered marriage premium. While both women and men receive marriage premiums and 
these premiums are larger for more recent cohorts, men’s premiums are consistently higher 
and have doubled from the late baby boomers cohort (NLSY79) to the late Generation X 
(Gen X) cohort (NLSY97). While there was no wage premium for cohabitation among baby 
boom cohort women, I observe a premium among Gen X men and women. Household 
specialization matters: while among baby-boomers the marriage premium did not vary by 
household type, among the Gen X cohort men’s marriage premium is significantly larger 
among male breadwinner households, and surprisingly, I find marriage penalties for men in 
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female-breadwinner households. Similarly, Gen X female breadwinners and female dual-
earners receive the marriage premium while Gen X women in male-breadwinner households 
experience marriage penalty. In addition, the more highly educated receive larger marital 
bonuses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................iii 
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................................vi 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES...........................................................................................3 
3. DATA AND METHOD.......................................................................................................13 
4. FINDINGS...........................................................................................................................18 
5. DISCUSSION......................................................................................................................30 
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table                                                                  Page 
1. NLSY79 and NLSY97 Means and Standard Deviations....................................................33 
2. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Alternate 
Specifications of Union Stats and Control Variables on Log of Hourly Earnings, By 
Sex…………...................................................................................................................……35 
 
3. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing 
Breadwinner, Dual-earner, and Men/Women in Female/Male-Breadwinner Households with 
Control Variables on Ln Hourly Wages, By Sex and Cohort ……………..….……..………37 
 
4. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Alternate 
Specifications of Union Status with Higher Education Interactions and Control Variables on 
Ln Earnings, By Sex and Cohort…………………………………………….……….………39 
 
APPENDIX A. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models 
Regressing Alternate Specifications of Union Stats and Control Variables on Percentile Wage 
Distributions, By Sex...............................................................................................................41 
 
APPENDIX B. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models 
Regressing Breadwinner, Dual-earner, and Men/Women in Female/Male-Breadwinner 
Households with Control Variables on Ln Hourly Wages, By Sex and 
Cohort.......................................................................................................................................43
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite multiple studies of the male marriage premium in heterosexual relationships 
(Dougherty 2006; Hill 2002; Krashinsky 2004; Light 2004; Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, and Lim 
1997; Sweeney 2002; Xie, Raymo, and Goyette 2003), there has been little research on the 
impact of marriage on women’s earnings. While early research indicates that marriage has a 
negative effect on women’s wages (Van der Klaauw, 1996), others find that women 
experience little to no marriage penalties (Korenman and Neumark 1992). More recently, a 
study found that women without children can achieve wage gains from marriage (Killewald 
and Gough 2013). Past research suggest that the effect of marriage on women’s wages varied 
within the baby boom generation. However, no studies to date have examine the marital wage 
premium for more recent cohorts. In this paper my goals are to ask 1) under what historical, 
institutional, or relational conditions is the influence of marriage positive, negative, or null on 
young men and women’s wages and 2) how have these patterns changed over time? 
Specifically, I consider wage premiums for marriage and cohabitation by gender and across 
cohorts. In addition, I examine how the intensity of spousal work hours and educational 
attainment moderate these premiums. 
Why study who gets the marriage wage premium? First, the structure of the marriage 
premium creates earning inequality between families (Cohen 2000). Because married men 
earn more, this may contribute to the wage gap between households headed by single women 
and those containing a married male breadwinner (McLanahan and Kelly 1999). Second, 
changes in the marriage premium have important implications for gender dynamics within 
families. Changes in the impact of marriage on earnings are expected because norms around 
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women’s employment are changing toward co-breadwinning rather than a strict gendered 
division of labor. Thus, investigating gender differences in the marriage premium is crucial to 
understanding who economically benefits from marriage (England 2000) and how gender 
frames the household division of labor (Coltrane 2000).  
This paper has two primary goals. The first is to examine the relationship between 
young heterosexual marriages and women’s wages, since there is relatively little literature 
about female marital wage premiums. Marital wage premiums are usually discussed as a long 
term labor market influences rather than a short term immediate effect (Waite, 1995). In this 
paper, the impact of marriage as a long term trait is analyzed with fixed-effects models, 
although my sample only allows for early returns to marriage. The second goal is to examine 
whether the marital premium is found among a more recent cohort. To accomplish this, I 
compare the impact of marriage on earnings for a late baby boomer cohort (born 1957-1965) 
represented by the NLSY79 and a late Gen X cohort (born 1980-1984), represented by the 
NLSY97. For both cohorts, I match age periods to examine the impact of marriage among 
young workers aged 18 to 31 years old. This age range captures the median age of first 
marriage, which ranges in the 1979-2010 period from 23.5 to 26.8 among women, and 25 to 
28.3 among men (Elliott et al, 2012).   
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Wage Premium for Marriage: Evidence and Explanations 
Past explanations of the marriage premium have largely focused on men and can be 
divided into three categories: (1) household specialization, (2) positive selection into 
marriage, and (3) employer favoritism. According to the first explanation, married men earn 
more than single men because they are more productive in market work due to the domestic 
supports provided by wives. According to the second, there is no causal relationship between 
marriage and men’s wages, rather married men are different from single men on the factors 
that predict men’s wages and marriage. According to the third, employers interpret marital 
status as a signal of stability and commitment to employment, drawing from cultural images 
of married man as breadwinners. I extend these theories to a more recent cohort of men and 
women to predict how these processes may alternately result in marriage premiums or 
penalties.  
Why might marriage influence women’s wages? Becker’s theory argues that women 
specialize in family responsibilities and housework following marriage, and as a result 
married women are predicted to be less productive in market work. Therefore, specialization 
would reduce marred women’s hourly earnings (Becker, 1985). Also, Becker’s specialization 
theory implies positive selection on labor market characteristics for men but negative 
selection into marriage for women. If men want to benefit from specialization following 
marriage, they may prefer to marry partners with domestic skills. Employer’s favoritism 
explains that employers may have stereotypes of married women. According to this 
explanation, employers may assume that married women are less productive than married 
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men or singles, because they spend more time and energy for household labor than their own 
career resources.  
Household Specialization 
 Becker (1981) argues that individuals’ productivity changes upon marriage with a 
gendered division of labor. According to Becker, marriage increases men’s specialization and 
their time allocation to the market work but decreases their specialization and time in the 
domestic work. While men are expected to focus on market work after they get married, 
women are expected to concentrate on housework and childcare. Consequently, married men 
will be more committed to paid work and more productive on the job than single men. For 
women this argument implies that marriage will have a negative effect on women’s earnings 
if they remain employed after marriage. Becker argues that women do not completely 
specialize in market work, because their human capital and time allocation investment is 
mainly related to increase “household efficiency” (p.39), not market efficiency.  
Becker (1985) further predicts a “decline in the gain from marriage” (p. S34). Due to 
women’s increased participation in the labor force and earning power, both men and women 
may experience decreased gendered division of labor in the household. Becker explains that 
married women have lower hourly earnings than singles and married men, because their 
responsibility for child care and household labor drains time and energy from their market 
work. Consequently, married women with greater domestic family responsibilities trade 
earnings for family-friendly jobs. Therefore, specialization theory expects that marriage will 
lead to increases in women’s time and energy in unpaid hours worked and decrease in their 
market work time, perhaps even in their at work productivity. 
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Most studies find that married men tend to earn significantly more than single men. 
However, research results on the relationship between specialization and male marriage 
premium are debated. Chun and Lee (2001) and Gray (1997) show that specialization can 
explain the male marriage premium. Especially, Gray (1997) argues that decline in the male 
marriage premium is due largely to declining specialization within household. But more 
recently, Dougherty (2006) casts doubt on the argument that specialization is the cause of the 
marriage wage premium for men. His findings show that marriage premium for men is a 
“maturation process” which starts in advance of marriage (p.440). As Killewald and Gough 
(2013) point out, most literatures on the male marriage premium does not capture the full 
range of Becker’s specialization hypothesis with a few exceptions (e.g. Dougherty, 2006). 
Moreover, previous literature focuses on married men’s overall earning advantages and do 
not pay attention to married women’s wage penalty.1 
In terms of gendered specialization within household, I expect weaker relationship 
for men and women within cohabitation compared to men and women within marriage. 
According to Shelton and John (1993), when young people decide their first union status, 
people with liberal gender-role attitude are more likely to have a preference for cohabitation. 
South and Spitze (1994) find that gender gap in doing housework is wider among married 
persons than cohabiters. While there is small difference between married men (19 hours) and 
cohabiting men (18 hours) for housework hours per week, married women spend 37 hours for 
housework per week, which is longer than cohabiting women (31 hours).  
                                           
1 Killewald and Gough (2013) address parenthood bonuses and penalties and link to marriage premiums and 
penalties. They argue that childless men and women receive a marital wage premium. In addition, fatherhood 
bonus is larger for married fathers than for unmarried fathers, and men receive fatherhood bonus only if they are 
married. However, motherhood penalty is not larger for married mothers than unmarried mothers. Therefore, 
their findings suggest the moderating effect of marriage on parenthood bonuses and penalties and how this effect 
is different by gender. 
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A number of recent studies show no effect or even a marriage bonus for baby boom 
women represented in the NLSY79 (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Killewald and 
Gough 2013). My question is whether this marriage penalty is continuing to decline, or even 
become a bonus among a more recent cohort of young adults. Importantly, I ask if change in 
gender norms over time leads to a marriage bonus among women of generation X, 
represented by the NLSY97 cohort. Women’s breadwinning capacity is increasingly 
important across the two cohorts over time. In late 70’s and early 80’s, there was erosion of 
men’s earnings with the loss of unionized jobs. My review of previous research on 
specialization and marriage wage premium generates the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1(a): Getting married will have a positive impact on wages for both men and 
women, albeit a larger impact for men’s wages.  
Hypothesis 1(b): The male marriage premium should be larger in the baby boom cohort 
when traditional gendered specialization was more common among households. The 
female marriage premium should be larger in the generation X cohort when traditional 
gendered specialization was less common among households. 
Hypothesis 1(c): Cohabitation should have a smaller impact on wages, relative to 
marriage, for both men and women.  
Becker’s theory suggest that whomever specializes in market work should benefit from 
the domestic work of the spouse/partner, regardless of gender. This means that women should get 
a larger marriage bonus if they are the breadwinners, compared to non-breadwinning women. Yet 
other scholars (England and Farkas, 1986) point out that this falsely assumes a gender-neutral 
labor market. If women do face more discrimination than men, they will not receive a larger 
marriage premium even though they specialize in market work. To test this, I examine the 
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marriage/cohabiting bonus by the level of specialization by gender in the household.  
Hypothesis 2(a): The marriage premium will vary by gender and whether the 
respondent is in a male-breadwinner, dual-earner, or female breadwinner household.  
Hypothesis 2(b): Among women, those in female-breadwinner households should 
receive the largest marriage premium while those in male breadwinner households 
should receive the smallest premium.  
Hypothesis 2(c): Among men, those in male breadwinner households should receive the 
largest marital premium while men in female breadwinner households should receive the 
smallest premium.  
Marriage Markets and Gendered Markers of Desirability 
A second explanation for the marriage wage premium is positive selection on pre-
marriage characteristics (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, and Lim 1997; Sweeney 2002; Sweeney 
and Cancian 2004; Xie, Raymo, and Goyette 2003). Again, this perspective was focused on 
the wage effects of marriage primarily for men. This view assumes that men with good 
prospects (as indicated by their earnings, educational attainment, and employment status) in 
the labor market will be more likely to marry, because they are better prepared to marry and 
are preferred by women in the marriage market.     
Becker’s (1981) theory of marriage assumes that married couples act as trading 
partners. Marriage occurs only if both partners believe the economic gains associated with 
marriage will be greater if married than if single (Sweeney, 1997). In Becker’s words: “the 
fundamental source of much of the gain is, as with households, the advantage of specialized 
investment and the division of labor” (p.36). This suggests that women who specialize in 
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child care and housework pair with men who specialize in paid work to create a gendered-
division of labor within households. In this scenario, spouses trade on their comparative 
advantages in specialization. According to Sweeney (1997), Becker’s specialization theory 
requires positive selection on labor market characteristics into marriage for men and negative 
selection into marriage for women. As a result, women will prefer men with high levels of 
education and high income potential in the marriage market (Blossfeld and Timm 2003). 
Similarly, if men expect that their partners will perform childcare and housework after 
marriage, men will invest more in their career resources. In this view, men value less 
women’s income potential because they expect to benefit from their wives’ household labor. 
Sweeny (1997) argues that women’s better labor market prospects will decrease the rate of 
marriage of women because the gendered division of labor within the household is less 
advantageous.  
However, recent studies show that positive selectivity into marriage is a possible 
explanation for women just as it is for men. In the United States, gender roles have changed 
significantly across cohort. The degree of specialization in gender roles has decreased. 
Women increasingly are expected to contribute financially to the household (Cha and 
Thebaud 2009; Gerson 2010). In addition, Sweeny (2000) suggests that female high wage 
earners are more likely to marry similar men. Men increasingly prefer high-achieving mates 
and place value on women’s income potential rather than women’s domestic skills (Buss et al 
2001; Fisman et al 2006; Willinger 1993). In this sense, high qualifications in the labor 
market predict marriage for women because men prefer women with earnings. High income 
women are more likely to be able to satisfy this preference. Therefore, the selection into 
marriage for women has become more similar to men’s.  
 9 
 
 To test whether the marriage wage premium results from differences between 
married and single men on unobserved and time-invariant characteristics, I will compare 
results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with fixed-effects models. If 
positive selection can explain the marriage wage premium, the marriage premium for men 
and women should be smaller in the fixed-effects model compared to the OLS regression 
model (Hodges and Budig, 2010), and smaller still when controls for human capital are 
included in the fixed effects model.  
Hypothesis 3: If positive selection can explain the marriage wage premium, the marriage 
premium will be smaller in the fixed-effects model than the OLS regression model, and 
still smaller with the inclusion of human capital measures.  
Employer Discrimination 
In marriages where specialization does not actually occur the premium could still 
accrue based on employers’ perceptions that marriage signals a more desirable worker. 
According to Hersch and Stratton (2000), household specialization or selection into marriage 
do not explain the marriage premium for white men. They find that married men spend 
almost the same amount of time in housework compared to single men, although married and 
unmarried men perform different type of home production activities. 
Hersch and Stratton (2000) suggest two alternative explanations for marital wage 
premium for white men: 1) some employers might value marital relationships and 
discriminate in favor of a married labor force when hiring, promoting, or training 2) married 
men may become “better workers” (p.93) because marriage makes them more stable. Another 
alternative explanation is a link between marriage and other desirable employment 
characteristics, such as fatherhood and hegemonic masculinity markers. Hodges and Budig 
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(2010) argue that within bureaucratic organizations, the fatherhood bonus is larger for men 
with hegemonic masculinity markers, such as white, married, in male breadwinner 
households, college graduates, and professional/managerial workers. Therefore, it is unclear 
that employers’ perceptions of marriage are gender neutral.  
The Potential Sources of the Different Marital Wage Premium 
Cohort Changes 
Since the 1960s, women’s labor force participation rates and the amount of time 
women devote to paid work have increased in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2013). 
Most married men did not have another breadwinner in his household in 1970, but now, most 
men marry working spouses. The importance of women’s earnings to families may change 
what makes them attractive on the marriage market and imply a possible positive effect of 
marriage on women’s wages. This trend challenges the assumption that women specialize in 
non-market work (Shelton and John 1996).  
Norms around division of labor at home have also changed. Women’s participation 
in paid work and men’s involvement in family responsibilities are increasingly considered the 
normative ideal (Brewster and Padavic 2000). In contrast to the theory of specialization and 
exchange, Ono (2003) finds that higher levels of income encourage first marriage formation 
for women in the United States. Thus, women's movement into market work casts doubt on 
the specialization theory and supports the claim that women and men can alter both market 
and non-market work allocations upon marriage.  
 Time-use studies claim that women’s paid work and men’s unpaid work does weaken 
the level of gendered time-use specialization (Gershuny and Robinson 1988; Robinson and 
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Godbey 1999). Robinson and Godbey (1999) suggest that cohort replacement with newer 
cohorts characterized by gender-neutral time use will lead to further change in gendered 
division of labor. However, scholars also find that women's paid work has increased 
significantly while men's unpaid work has not significantly increased. Coltrane (2000) reports 
that women still do at least twice as much housework as men, although men’s hourly 
contributions to housework have increased. Hook (2010) suggests that when spouses both 
work full time, they are less likely to specialize. However, even in these households, women 
do majority of the housework and childcare. Thus, men's relative contributions to housework 
and childcare time have changed more slowly, although women’s breadwinning capacity has 
significantly increased over the past five decades (Bianchi and Milkie 2010).   
Education 
Education level may have an impact on marriage premium or marriage penalty. 
College-educated women typically do less housework than non-college educated women 
(Sanchez and Thomson 1997; Pittman and Blanchard 1996). College-educated women also 
spend more time on market work and less time on housework tasks compared to non-college 
educated women.  
In addition, marriage rates have been declining for all men and women since 1970. 
These rates of decline are greater for the less-educated population. Consequently, the 
marriage rates gap between the more-educated population and the less-educated population 
has widened since 1970 (Pew research center, 2010). Changes in the marriage rates of the 
less-educated population implies that earning gaps between married and unmarried people 
may have increased over time. Because of these compositional changes in the married 
population, marriage has become more selective.  
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 The economic/bargaining perspective argues that housework allocation depends on 
the relative earning power of the partners (Blau 1998). The partner with higher earnings has 
less comparative advantage in unpaid work and may spend more time doing market work. 
The partners with lower earnings, typically women, are considered economically dependent 
on men. Partners with lower earnings allocate more time to non-market work to compensate 
for the other’s market work. However, recent trends show that women’s relative earning 
power has increased over time. In 1970, only 4% of U.S.-born men ages 30 to 44 were 
married to wives whose income exceed theirs. By 2007 this share had increased to 22% (Pew 
research center, 2010). 
There is no consensus on whether relative economic resources of the partners 
determine the allocation of housework. Sayer (2010) points out that although women’s 
allocation of time to paid work and men’s allocation of time to household task have increased, 
women consistently spend more time in their housework compared to men. Using the 
Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) from the mid-1960s to the early 2000s, her findings 
show that time use for men and women has changed historically across nine western 
countries (four “liberal”, three “conservative,” and two Nordic states). Her empirical findings 
suggest that the increase in men’s household time allocation has “stalled” in many countries, 
such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway. 
Therefore, men’s share of household tasks has changed far less dramatically and their time 
allocation in housework is much less compared to women’ time share of housework.  
Hypothesis 4: Since marriage among the under-educated population has declined, 
college-educated men and women in the Gen X cohort will receive larger marriage 
premiums than comparable baby boomer men and women.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHOD 
Data 
This paper uses the 1979-1989 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79) and the 1997-2010 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY97). The NLSY79 and the NLSY97 are large panel studies which include detailed data 
on marriage transitions and economic behavior. The NLSY79 has been the data set of choice 
for many researchers interested in assessing the wage effects of family status transitions (e.g. 
Budig and England 2001; Dougherty 2006; Glauber 2007; Killewald and Gough 2013). Both 
data sets are valuable for investigating family formation questions, because of their focus on 
the experiences of young adults, who are at the highest risk for transitions to cohabitation, 
marriage, and parenthood.  
The NLSY79 was collected between 1979 and 2008. Respondents were first 
surveyed in 1979, when they were 14-22 years old. They were re-interviewed annually 
through 1994, and biannually thereafter. The NLSY97 initiated with a new cohort in 1997 as 
a sample of participants ages 12 to 17. They were surveyed each year through 2010. In the 
NLSY79 data set, by the year of the last publicly-available wave (2010), the respondents are 
ages 45-53. Compared to the NLSY79, NLSY97 respondents were ages 25 to 31 when 
interviewed in 2010. To address these issues, I matched the survey waves to ensure 
comparability. I use the NLSY79 respondents from 1979 to 1989 to match the age ranges 
with the NLSY97 data sets from 2004 to 2010. I do not include person years from the 
NLSY79 cohort that are below or beyond the observed ages of the NLSY97 cohort. In sum, 
respondents are ages 18 to 31 in both datasets.  
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Because the upper age range for respondents are 31 in both datasets, I am not able to 
capture late marriages (post-age 31), and that these might be more likely to occur among the 
highly educated. This may be the group that I find the largest marital bonus, so I am likely 
underestimating the size of the marital bonus for both cohorts. Finally, I am only looking at 
employed persons because I am examining earnings. Thus, those who marry and leave the 
labor force without re-entering during my observation window are not included in the 
analyses.   
In addition, I explore how cohort changes may contribute to marriage premium. For 
the NLSY79 sample, I exclude the military sample, which was not re-interviewed after 1984. 
Also, person-years whose status are full-time students or unemployed are not included in the 
model.  
Variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wage in the respondent’s current 
job. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index, I adjust all wages to 2010 
dollars. The focus on wages, rather than on labor supply or earnings, reflects the theoretical 
focus on the relationship between union status, individuals’ labor-market productivity, and 
the financial returns to their labor (Killewald and Gough 2010). It is also consistent with 
existing literature on both the male marriage premium and the motherhood penalty (Budig 
and England 2001; Chun and Lee 2001; Dougherty 2006; Glauber 2007; Loh 1996; 
Waldfogel 1997). I recoded wages above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile of the 
weighted distribution to the 99th and 1st percentile, respectively. Because of the nature of the 
fixed-effects model, the respondent is excluded if he or she reported earnings only once.  
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Marital status variables 
The principle independent variable is union status. Union status is grouped into four 
categories: never-married and living singly (the reference category), in non-marital co-
residential unions, married, or divorced (Killewald and Gough 2013). Previous studies 
suggest that the marriage wage premium is different from cohabitation wage premium 
(Cohen 2002; Loh 1996). Therefore, I distinguish between cohabiters and other married 
individuals. The “divorced” category includes widows, since the number of widows in the 
NLSY97 are too few cases to analyze separately (Hodges and Budig 2010).  
Education and labor supply variables 
Education is measured categorically. Respondents are grouped into either of five categories 
in education dummy variables, depending on whether they have, by any given year, received 
less than high school education, received a high school diploma, received some 
college/associates degree, or received a bachelor’s degree or higher. High school dropouts are 
as the reference category in the analysis. For higher education interactions model, college 
education is measured by a dummy variable (non-college graduates are the reference category) 
in interaction with marital status variables. In this model, linear education variable is dropped 
out from the model to avoid clouding the meaning of college education in the interaction.  
Employment 
Respondents’ years of seniority (experience with current employer) and years of total work 
experience are included in the model. To control for work effort, total working hours per 
week are added. Controlling for the effect of job turnover on wages, the total number of jobs 
ever worked by the respondents are included. Based on Becker’s specialization argument, 
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controls for spousal work hours should be included in the model to test the argument. In the 
NLSY97, spouse work hours are only available from 2005 to 2011. Since the survey asks 
how many hours per week spouse worked in past year, I have 7 consecutive years of spouse 
work hours from 2004 to 2010. I coded employment hours as dummy variable to indicate 
whether individuals’ spouse work full-time or part-time. If spouse’s weekly working hours 
are less than 35 hours, it is coded as part-time.  
Demographic and family controls 
Marriage is associated with motherhood, which has a negative association with women’s 
wages among white women and Latinas (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Waldfogel 
1997). Therefore, number of children born to the individual at the time of the current survey 
wave should be controlled. Demographic controls also include age and region. Age is not 
included in fixed-effects models, but is implicitly controlled because period and cohort 
together uniquely determine age (Budig and England, 2001). Region variables include 
dummy variables for south, northeast, north central, and west (west is reference category). 
Statistical Model 
I use OLS and fixed-effects regression models to analyze NLSY data arranged in a 
pooled time-series cross-section with person-year as units of analysis. In FE models effects 
are fixed for years and persons. That is, the coefficients on independent variables are 
estimated with controls for person and year dummies. Person fixed-effects are useful for 
eliminating omitted-variable bias created by the failure to include controls for unmeasured, 
unchanging personal characteristics that have additive effects (Allison 2009). Fixed-effects 
models estimate change in each respondent’s wage from year to year and then aggregates 
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these within-person changes across all years in the analysis. This allows me to compare wage 
trajectories in the years before marriage with wages trajectories in the period after marriage. 
Fixed effects estimation should control for unobserved time-invariant individual-specific 
characteristics that influence the probability of marriage (Hersch and Stratton, 2000). 
However, there are some limitations to this method. Fixed-effects models are limited if an 
omitted variable affects the possibility of getting married and interacts with another variable 
affecting wages, the models do not eliminate this type of bias (Budig, 2006).  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis; Means 
and standard deviations are presented for each sex in married/unmarried group. The unit of 
analysis is the person-year observations. It is important to remember that only employed 
respondents age 18 to 31 are included in the sample. T-tests for quantitative variables and 
Chi-Square tests for qualitative variables are used to test for significant statistical differences 
within gender groups to examine whether differences by marital status are significant.   
In terms of family structure and demographic characteristics, married men and 
women are more likely to have a child and to be older than their unmarried peers in the 
NLSY79 and the NLSY97. There are more unmarried men and women who live in urban 
areas compared to their married peers in both data sets. Married men and women are more 
likely to live in the southern region of the United States.  
 In terms of years of education, in the NLSY97, married women average about 13.5 
years and unmarried women average about 13.1 years. Married men average about 13 years 
while unmarried men average 12.6 years of education. Turning to the NLSY79, we see that 
women average about 12.9 years of education with no differences by marital status. Overall, 
men average slightly less than women. Married men having a higher mean of 12.3 years of 
education compared to unmarried men in the NLSY79. Turning to highest degree obtained, 
we see that unmarried men are more likely to be high school dropouts than are women and 
married men in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. In terms of bachelor’s degree and beyond, 
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married women are the most educated group in both data sets.  
 Turning to employment characteristics, I find significant marital status gaps in hourly 
earnings where the gap is larger among men than among women in both cohorts. Married 
men and women have greater job tenure. Married men have the most job experience, and 
work the longest hours in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. Unmarried men have the greatest 
job turn over in the NLSY79, but unmarried women have the most frequent job turnover in 
the NLSY97. Unmarried men in the NLSY79 and unmarried women in the NLSY97 are 
more likely to work irregular shifts. Married men are more likely to be union members in the 
both cohorts. 
Regression Analysis 
Table 2, 3, and 4 show the coefficients and standard errors from OLS and fixed-
effects regression from 12 different models. Comparing OLS and fixed-effects models 
addresses Hypothesis 3 which tests positive selection theory. All models were run separately 
by gender. Models in Table 2 address Hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) which concern the 
positive or negative relationship between marriage and wages. Table 2 represents that the 
effects of all marital status variables (never-married, married, cohabiting, and divorced) on 
the natural log of hourly earnings controlling for demographic and family characteristics, 
human capital and individual labor supply, and spouse’s work hours.  
Models in Table 3 address Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c). This table shows how 
hourly wages are different among three categories for both sets of analyses (men’s analyses 
and women’s analyses) by cohorts. Three categories are as follows: 1) male/female 
breadwinners, 2) dual-earners, and 3) men/women in female/male breadwinner household. In 
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this table, breadwinners indicate that men or women married to/cohabiting with partners who 
work less than full-time (work less than 35 hours weekly) or who do not work at all. Dual-
earners indicate that men or women married to/cohabiting with partners who work full-time 
(work 35 hours and more weekly). Men/women in female/male breadwinner households 
mean that his/her partners work full-time and he/she who work less than full-time (work less 
than 35 hours weekly) or who do not work at all.  
Models in Table 4 address the predictions of Hypothesis 4. Table 4 represents that 
union status variables (four categories) are interacted with college education (college 
graduates = 1, non-college graduates = 0) to test for significant differences by education 
within each gender group. Where interactions are significant, the slopes for each group are 
presented for the union status variables. Where education did not significantly interact with 
union status variables, the values for education groups (within gender) are the same.  
For table 2 and table 4, the set of columns, headed the NLSY79 (1979-1989) and the 
NLSY97 (1997-2010) show two different data sets. Within each data set, “Model A” presents 
results from the OLS models with robust standard errors. Model A shows the effects of union 
status (married, cohabiting, and divorced, with never-married as the reference category) on 
the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for demographic and family characteristics as 
detailed in table 1. OLS models, which do not otherwise control for time, include age and age 
squared. “Model B” shows results from the Fixed-effects models with robust standard errors. 
Fixed-effects regression is used in Model B to control for selection into marriage on time 
invariant characteristics and addresses Hypothesis 3. “Model C” adds controls for education 
and individual labor supply characteristics. Fixed-effects regression is used in Model C to 
control for selection into marriage based on human capital and labor supply characteristics. 
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Finally, “Model D” adds in spouse’s weekly work hours. These variables are also detailed in 
table 1. Presenting the finding in this manner allows us to see the total effects of union status 
on earnings and how they are moderated by the inclusion of theoretically relevant control 
variables. I refer to models with fixed-effects, except where otherwise noted.  
For table 3, OLS and fixed-effects base-line models include six sets of variables 
as married breadwinner, married dual-earner, married men/women in female/male 
breadwinner household, cohabiting breadwinner, cohabiting dual-earner, and cohabiting 
men/women in male/female breadwinner household without control variables. Consequently, 
demographic and family characteristics and education and individual labor supply 
characteristics are included in the model. To control for unobserved time-invariant differences, 
the fixed-effects models replicate the OLS models, using person- and year-fixed effects. 
Models in Table 3 explore how household specialization and education moderate marital 
premium. 
Again, spouse work hours information is available for restricted years in the 
NLSY97 from 2004 to 2010. To make comparative models based on spouse weekly work 
hours, I use restrict years of observation for both datasets; years of observation from 1984 to 
1989 in the NLSY79 and years of observation from 2004 and 2010 are used for this analysis. 
In addition, there needs to be a clear definition of what breadwinner or dual-earner means. 
Therefore, only full-time working respondents are included in the model.  
OLS and Fixed-Effects Regression Results 
 The results are presented in Table 2, 3, and 4. Considering men first, we see that all 
the married and cohabiting men have higher log of hourly earnings, compared to never-
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married men in both cohorts. I present results from ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression 
models first to get a sense of how much selection matters. Since OLS models contain greater 
omitted-variable bias, the comparison to the fixed-effects model shows whether those who 
have married have higher earning-potential based on their unobserved characteristics (Budig 
and England, 2001).  
 In Table 2, for men in NLSY79 cohort, the OLS model shows a gross marriage 
premium of 16.8 percent [(exp(0.155)-1)*100], which is absolutely 9.8 percent higher than 
the result from the fixed-effects model (7 percent). This suggests strong positive selectivity 
into marriage on unmeasured characteristics. Model B presents wage premium in the effects 
of marriage and cohabiting on wages where married men receive significantly higher wages 
(7 percent) compared to cohabiting men (4.4 percent). When we look at model C for 
NLSY79 cohort, we find that with the inclusion of human capital and labor supply 
characteristics, the wage premium for marriage persists (5.5) percent. Adding spouses’ work 
hours has an impact on marriage wage premium for men. Model D shows that Male wage 
premium for marriage and cohabiting is not statistically significant after controlling spouses’ 
work hours in the 79 cohort.  
For the NLSY97 cohort men, Model A’s OLS results also present higher wage 
premium for married men. Results from Model A presents 19.8 percent of wage premium for 
married men and 6.9 percent premium for cohabiting men. Model B shows a lower marriage 
wage premium compared to Model A, but Model B still shows men enjoy a large wage 
premium of marriage (11.7 percent), relative to 5.8% for cohabiting men. The NLSY 97 
cohort, Model C, controlling for human capital, also shows married men (10.7 percent) and 
cohabiting men (5.8 percent) have significantly higher natural log of hourly earnings than 
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never-married men. Model D presents that there is no wage premium for married and 
cohabiting men after controlling spouses’ work hours.  
 For women in the NLSY79 cohort, results from OLS model presents a small 
marriage premium compared to men’s marriage premium. Results from Model A show a 3.5 
percent wage premium for married women and 3 percent premium for cohabiting women. 
Model B shows that married women and divorced women received higher wages (3.1 percent 
and 4.4 percent) relative to never-married women. Model C presents 1.8 percent of wage 
premium for married women and 3.2 percent of wage premium for divorced women, but 
those results are only marginally significant (0.1 level).  
 For women in the NLSY97 cohort, the OLS model shows the highest marriage 
premium among all models for women, 11.1 percent. Model B presents 3.7 percent wage 
premium for married women and 3.4 percent premium for cohabiting women. However, 
wage premium among married women disappears for Model C in both cohorts. In addition, 
Model D shows that wage difference by marital status is not statistically significant after 
adding spouse work hours to the model for women in both cohorts.  
 Hypothesis 1(a) predicts a positive impact of marriage on men’s wages. The results 
from Table 2 support that married men consistently receive higher hourly wages than 
unmarried men after including controls for demographic and family characteristics, education 
and individual labor supply characteristics. However, married man’s wage premium is not 
statistically significant after including spouse’s weekly work hours. Hypothesis 1(b) assumes 
that men’s marriage premium is larger among baby boomers than Gen X’s because traditional 
gendered specialization was more common among baby boomer households. Surprisingly, the 
full model which includes human capital and labor supply characteristics show that Gen X 
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men receive a 10.7% marriage premium while baby boomer men receive a 5.5% marriage 
premium compared to never-married men of their same cohort. Cohabiting men receive 
smaller wage premium than married men in both cohorts. Thus, men’s results in Table 2 
support Hypothesis 1(a) but fail to support Hypothesis 1(b). In addition, men’s results support 
Hypothesis 1(c).  
 Hypothesis 1(a) also predicts a positive impact of marriage on women’s wages. The 
results show that women in both cohorts receive marriage premiums. Baby boomer women 
receive a 3.1 percent marriage premium and Gen X women receive a 3.7 percent marriage 
premium compared to same-cohort never-married women. Unlike men’s results, women’s 
marriage premium is explained by positive selection on human capital and labor supply 
controls. Notably, Gen X women receive a 3.4 percent cohabitation premium while the baby 
boomer women do not. Therefore, women’s results in Table 2 do support Hypothesis 1(a) and 
Hypothesis 1(b), and Hypothesis 1(c).  
In the baby boom cohort, there is a marital wage premium for men in all models 
except Model D. In the OLS models that include controls for time-changing selection factors, 
men's marriage premiums are the largest in both cohorts. Fixed-effects model is used in 
Model B to control for selection into marriage on time invariant characteristics. As 
Hypothesis 3 predicts, the marriage premium is smaller in the fixed-effects model than the 
OLS regression model. This indicates that the baby boomer and Generation X’s marriage 
premiums are partially operating through positive selection into marriage on factors that 
predict higher earnings.  
 Table 3 shows how men and women in male breadwinner, dual-earner, and female 
 25 
 
breadwinner households receive different marriage wage premiums.2 All results are from the 
OLS models and fixed effects regression models with robust standard errors. These models 
suggest that male breadwinner marriages confer greater rewards than dual-earner marriages 
or cohabiting for baby boomer men and for all Gen X’s. However, for the recent cohorts, the 
wage difference between breadwinner marriage and dual-earner marriage is very small in 
fixed effects models with control variables. For baby boomer men there is no difference in 
the marriage premium between male breadwinner and dual earner households in fixed effects 
models with family and demographic controls. After adding human capital controls, male 
breadwinner households show a 0.8 percent larger male marriage premium. For Gen X 
women fully saturated fixed-effects models show marriage premiums for dual-earner women 
only.   
In the baby boom cohort, there is a marital wage premium for men in all models 
except the fixed-effects human capital model. In the OLS models that include controls for 
time-changing selection factors, men's marriage premium is largest when they are in male-
breadwinner households. However, in the fixed effects models, which control for time-
invariant selection factors are introduced, I do not observe differences in men's marriage 
premium across household type. Moreover, it is fully explained once human capital variables 
are introduced to the fixed-effects model. This indicates that the baby boomer male marriage 
premium is operating through positive selection into marriage on factors that predict higher 
earnings.  
However, Gen X men receive dramatically stronger marriage premiums3 that vary 
                                           
2 Full results (including cohabiting men and women) presented in Appendix B.  
3 I appended together both data sets (NLSY79 and NLSY97) to test significant differences by gender and across 
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by household type and are not fully explained by selection factors. In the OLS models, I 
consistently observe the largest marriage premiums in male breadwinner families, somewhat 
smaller, but still large, marriage premiums for men in dual-earner families, and marriage 
penalties for men in female-breadwinner households. It is possible that if men in female-
breadwinner families are more likely to signal to employers or note in their resumes that they 
took time off to help raise a family. If so, their periods of underemployment or unemployment 
may be more penalized in the labor market than men who had conventional spells of male 
unemployment. While these differences are muted in the fixed-effects baseline models, the 
fully saturated fixed-effects model shows the same pattern: Largest male marriage premiums 
in male breadwinner households and male marriage penalties in female breadwinner 
households. 
For women in the baby boom cohort, there is a marital wage premium in the OLS 
models. In the baseline model without control variables, there are differences in women's 
marriage premium across household type. There are marriage premiums for female-
breadwinners and female-dual earners, but marriage penalties for women in male-
breadwinner households. However, penalties for women in male-breadwinner households 
erode when family and human capital control variables are included in the OLS models. In 
the fixed-effects models, the baby boom cohort shows marriage penalty for female 
breadwinners. Although results in the OLS models show that there is marriage premium for 
women in the baby boom cohort, female breadwinners experience marriage penalties in the 
fixed-effects models.  
   For Gen X women, there is a marital wage premium in all models except in male-
                                                                                                                                   
cohorts.  
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breadwinner households. In the OLS models, baseline model without control variables show 
that female-breadwinners receive larger marriage premium than female dual-earners. 
However, the wage premium difference between female breadwinner and female dual-earner 
erodes when demographic, family, and human capital characteristics are included. Also, in the 
fixed-effects models, there is no statistically significant wage difference between female 
breadwinners and female dual-earners. However, women in male-breadwinner households 
experience marriage penalty in all OLS and fixed-effects models. Previously, OLS and fixed-
effects model results for Gen X men show marriage penalties for men in female-breadwinner 
households. Likewise, Gen X women in male-breadwinner households experience a stronger 
female marriage penalty.   
Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) predict that household specialization matters for the 
size of the marriage premium. As Hypothesis 2(b) predicts, male breadwinner receive a larger 
marriage premium than male dual-earners or men in female breadwinner household. In 
addition, men in female breadwinner households experience wage penalty in more recent 
cohort. This implies that the gap in men's marriage premium across household type gets 
larger in the recent cohort. As Hypothesis 2(c) predicts, female breadwinners receive a larger 
marriage premium than female dual-earners or women in male breadwinner household 
among Generation X cohort. However, results in the baby boom cohort do support the 
hypothesis; female breadwinners in the baby boom cohort experience wage penalty. Unlike 
the women in the baby boom cohort, female breadwinners and dual-earners in more recent 
cohort receive marriage premium but there are male marriage penalties in male breadwinner 
households. In sum, the overarching story is that marriage matters more in the Gen X cohort 
than in the baby boom cohort for both women and men.  
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 Turning to table 4, differences between college-educated and non-college educated 
men in baby boom cohort are muted in the OLS baseline models. This finding is reversed in 
fixed-effects regression model (Model B), which control for time-invariant selection factors 
are introduced, Model B shows that college-educated married men and college-educated 
cohabiting men receive higher wages (13.3% and 16.6%) in baby boom cohort. Model C 
present that there are no differences by college education in marriage wage premium. For 
baby boomer men, the college-educated receive 15 percent cohabitation premium while non-
college educated men received 3.4 percent cohabitation premium. Among Gen X men, the 
OLS models shows there are no differences in the marriage premium by college education. 
This finding is inconsistent in fixed-effects regression models. Model B, Model C, Model D 
show that college-educated men receive a larger cohabitation premium than non-college 
educated men.  
 For women in baby boom cohort, both the OLS models and the fixed-effects models 
suggest that college-educated women receive a marriage wage premium compared to non-
college educated women. According to result from the OLS model, college-educated baby 
boomer women receive a 5.7 percent marriage premium while non-college women receive a 
2.3 percent marriage premium. Also, the fixed-effects model shows the same pattern for baby 
boomer women; the college-educated receive a larger marriage premium than the non-college 
educated.  
Marriage premium patterns among Gen X women are similar to those of baby 
boomer women. College-educated women consistently receive larger marriage premium than 
non-college educated women. In the baseline OLS model, Gen X college-educated women 
receive a 15.7% premium while the non-college educated receive an 11.7% of premium. The 
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human capital fixed-effects model shows a larger difference by college education, with Gen 
X college educated women receiving a 9.2% marriage premium compared to 0.3 percent for 
non-college women. Noticeably, Gen X college-educated women receive a cohabitation 
premium, which is not found among baby boom women. In the fixed-effects model with 
human capital controls, Gen X college-educated women receive a 10.2% cohabitation 
premium, which is larger than that of non-college-educated women. Therefore, findings in 
Table 4 support the Hypothesis 4, which predicts college-educated Gen X men and women 
will receive larger marriage premiums than baby boomer men and women. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Recent studies find that marriage is associated with higher wages for childless 
women as well using the baby boom cohort. While models that are unable to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity indicate actual change in behavior resulting from marriage (e.g. the 
stability induced by marriage), I find that married men consistently receive the highest wages 
relative to all other groups. Gen X men experience an almost doubled marital wage premium, 
compared to the baby boom cohort. In contrast, married women’s marriage premium, while 
larger among Gen X’s, can be explained by positive selection into marriage, based on 
unobservable factors and human capital and labor supply controls. Importantly, the marriage 
premium differs across household types, and spousal work hours matter more among Gen X’s. 
The baby boomer men's marriage premium is largest when they are in male-breadwinner 
households. However, in the fixed-effects models, which control for time-invariant selection 
factors, differences in men's marriage premium across household type erode. Gen X men 
show the largest marriage premiums in male breadwinner households and actually incur 
marriage penalties in female breadwinner households. Women in the baby boom cohort 
shows marriage penalty for female breadwinners in fixed-effects models,  while women in 
more recent cohort show marriage premium for female-breadwinners and dual-earners. 
However, women in male-breadwinner households experience wage penalty. College-
educated men and women receive more wage premium for marriage and cohabiting, 
respectively.  
What predicts a larger male premium in earlier baby boom cohort? First, 
specialization in marriage and partner preference in marriage markets suggests that women of 
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earlier cohort would select men more on men’s potential earning power. Second, changing 
age at first marriage across cohorts would suggest that the negative selection into early 
marriage would predominate more in the Gen X cohort, thus baby boom cohort’s marriage 
premium should be larger than Gen X cohort’s premium, unless the negative selection into 
early marriage has changed across cohort such that those with poorer labor market 
characteristics are not marrying at all, or waiting even more.  
However, findings suggest larger, rather than a smaller premium in the Gen X cohort. 
Why might we observe a stronger marriage premium among Gen X men? One reason could 
be if men who are less educated or with poor labor market characteristics are not marrying or 
marrying less in the Gen X relative to the baby boom cohort. Since 1970, marriage rates have 
decreased for all men and women and declined most sharply for the least educated population 
(Pew Research Center, 2010). Therefore, men and women with less education are less likely 
to be married compared to those with more education. Second, employers may value 
marriage more in recent cohort. Now marriage is rarer, so it gives a more positive signal to 
employers. Another possible explanation is that marriage is associated with other desirable 
employment characteristics, such as fatherhood and other markers of hegemonic masculinity 
(Correll, Bernard, and Paik 2007; Hodges and Budig 2010). Finally, the rising inequalities in 
the US labor market and declining wages for less-educated population over time may explain 
increasing earnings inequality between married and unmarried men and women (Moffitt, 
2000). However, percentile wage distribution models do not support the rising inequality 
hypothesis (see Appendix A).  
There are some limitations to this study. First, since the oldest respondents are only 
age 31, the findings do not capture men and women who marry post-age 31. Young peoples' 
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decision to delay marriage is possibly related to completing their education or develop their 
career, so I may find the largest marital bonus from this group. Therefore, it is possible that I 
am underestimating the size of the marital bonus for both cohorts. Second, baby boomers 
were more likely to leave the labor market and not come back into the labor market, if at all, 
until well after the childrearing years (post-age 31). This is much less true of gen X’ers. It 
needs to investigate further how this cohort difference will bias the analytical comparison. 
Third, the NLSY data sets do not provide information on unpaid work hours, such as 
housework or childcare, and therefore I am unable to uncover the impact of unpaid work on 
marriage premium. As time-use studies suggested, unpaid work hours are also important to 
look at the relationship between gender division of household labor and wages. Thus, unpaid 
work may change a degree of specialization and marriage wage premium. Lastly, only 
employed respondents are included in the analyses because I am examining hourly wages. 
Thus, if respondents marry and then leave the labor force without re-entering during my 
observation window, they are not included in the analyses.   
This paper contributes to empirical perspectives on marriage premium for young men 
and women. The wage premium for married women has been relatively unexplored, despite 
extensive literature on the marriage premium for men and the motherhood penalty. In 
addition, most literature regarding marriage premium used the baby boom cohort. This paper 
fills the gap in the existing literature by providing new findings on marriage premium with 
the generation X.   
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Table 1. NLSY79 and NLSY97 Means and Standard Deviations (continued onto next page) 
  NLSY79 (1979-1989) NLSY97 (1997-2010) 
  Men 
Sig. 
Test 
Women 
Sig. 
Test 
Men 
Sig. 
Test 
Women 
Sig. 
Test 
 
Married Unmarried 
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Number of Person-years 7,404 11,963   6,881 9,761   3,076 12,850   4,114 11,264   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Family & Demographics   
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
Number of Children  .960 .221 * .751 .247 * .977 .303 * .990 .548 * 
 
(.940) (.584) 
 
(.870) (.571) 
 
(.975) (.657) 
 
(1.006) (.867) 
 
Age 25.079 22.867 * 24.488 23.086 * 25.438 23.229 * 25.012 23.366 * 
 
(3.026) (3.063) 
 
(3.086) (3.116) 
 
(2.570) (2.996) 
 
(2.755) (2.995) 
 
Urban Residence 73.7% 81.2% * 76.9% 83.0% * 69.5% 76.4% * 71.2% 80.5% * 
West 19.8% 20.7% 
 
17.7% 18.0% 
 
23.7% 22.7%   23.5% 22.0% * 
Northeastern Region 15.0% 20.2% * 17.8% 22.2% * 12.2% 17.5% * 09.1% 18.5% * 
Northcentral Region 24.3% 22.2% * 24.9% 22.9% * 26.2% 22.3% * 24.1% 20.6% * 
Southern Region 40.6% 36.4% * 39.5% 36.6% * 37.4% 37.2%   42.7% 38.7% * 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
Human Capital & Labor 
Supply 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Years of Education   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Highest Grade Attained 12.237 12.114 * 12.859 12.858 
 
13.033 12.586 * 13.467 13.073 * 
 
(2.254) (2.042) 
 
(1.953) (1.883) 
 
(2.443) (2.226) 
 
(2.529) (2.352) 
 
Degree   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
High School Dropout 21.0% 21.9% 
 
8.2% 8.4% 
 
11.8% 15.5% * 8.8% 12.1% * 
High School Graduate 50.5% 53.2% * 52.8% 52.0% 
 
62.7% 67.6% * 57.4% 63.3% * 
Some College 15.9% 15.2% 
 
22.5% 24.2% * 5.1% 3.7% * 8.1% 4.5% * 
Bachelor  9.8% 8.3% * 14.0% 13.5% 
 
17.2% 12.2% * 21.1% 17.9% * 
Masters/Doctorate 2.8% 1.4% * 2.6% 2.1% * 3.3% 1.0% * 4.6% 2.2% * 
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  NLSY79 (1979-1989) NLSY97 (1997-2010) 
  Men 
Sig. 
Test 
Women 
Sig. 
Test 
Men 
Sig. 
Test 
Women 
Sig. 
Test 
 
Married Unmarried 
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Married  Unmarried  
 
Number of Person-years 7,404 11,963   6,881 9,761   3,076 12,850   4,114 11,264   
Job Tenure 3.158 1.980 * 2.769 2.104 * 2.852 2.024 * 2.461 1.839 * 
 
(2.777) (2.130)   (2.525) (2.171) 
 
(2.528) (2.080)   (2.225) (1.797) 
 
Job Experience 6.114 4.291 * 5.423 4.379 * 7.683 5.501 * 6.980 5.409 * 
 
(2.865) (2.640)   (2.853) (2.692) 
 
(2.997) (2.934)   (3.148) (2.908) 
 
# of Jobs Ever Held 1.521 1.729 * 1.47 1.688 * 1.426 1.662 * 1.445 1.740 * 
 
(.842) (.954)   (.764) (.933) 
 
(.814) (.956)   (.804) (.995) 
 
Usual Work Hours 40.157 37.048 * 34.187 33.494 * 40.229 37.203 * 34.827 34.332 * 
 
(11.651) (12.868)   (10.805) (11.677) 
 
(11.622) (12.151)   (12.755) (11.999) 
 
Job Characteristics   
 
  
   
  
 
    
  
Hourly Wage $17.54  $14.20  * $13.38  $12.53  * $17.13 $13.00 * $13.86 $11.35 * 
 
(8.38) (7.47) 
 
(7.05) (6.13) 
 
(10.60) (9.20) 
 
(9.49) (7.67) 
 
Log Wage 2.758 2.537 * 2.477 2.425 * 2.659 2.384 * 2.433 2.260 * 
 
(.470) (.482) 
 
(.493) (.464) 
 
(.658) (.609) 
 
(.655) (.590) 
 
Irregular Shift 13.2% 16.4% * 13.5% 15.9% * 15.8% 15.4% 
 
14.6% 18.1% * 
Union Member 13.8% 13.1% 
 
9.3% 8.7% 
 
13.1% 10.1% * 8.6% 8.6% 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Notes: *= p < .05 for within-gender t-test or chi-square test for significant difference by marital status  
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Table 2. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Alternate Specifications of Union Stats and Control 
Variables on Log of Hourly Earnings, By Sex (continued onto next page) 
 
  NLSY79 (1979-1989)   NLSY97 (1997-2010)   
 
Men Women  Significant Men Women Significant 
Number of Person-years 19,367 16,642 Differences* 15,926 15,378 Differences*  
MODEL A (OLS)  
        
  
        
  
Demographic & Family Controls     
Married .155 *** .034 *** a,c .181 *** .105 *** a,c 
 
(.008) 
 
(.008)     (.014) 
 
(.012) 
 
  
Cohabiting .028 * .030 *   .067 *** .001 
 
a 
 
(.014) 
 
(.015)     (.013) 
 
(.012) 
 
  
Divorced .042 ** .016   a,c .100 *** -.015 
 
a,c 
  (.017)   (.013)     (.037)   (.033)     
MODEL B (Fixed-Effect) 
        
  
        
  
Demographic & Family Controls     
Married .068 *** .031 ** a, b .111 *** .036 * a,b 
 
(.009) 
 
(.010)     (.018) 
 
(.017) 
 
  
Cohabiting .043 ** .012     .056 *** .033 *   
 
(.013) 
 
(.014)     (.014) 
 
(.013) 
 
  
Divorced .030 
 
.041 *   .044 
 
.000 
 
  
  (.017)   (.017)     (.039)   (.034)     
 MODEL C (Fixed-Effect) 
        
  
        
  
Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor Supply     
Married .054 *** .018 + a, b .102 *** .017 
 
a,b 
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(.010) 
 
(.010)     (.018) 
 
(.017) 
 
  
Cohabiting .040 ** .009     .056 *** .023 + a 
 
(.013) 
 
(.014)     (.014) 
 
(.013) 
 
  
Divorced .025 
 
.032 +   .037 
 
-.005 
 
  
 
(.017) 
 
(.017)     (.039) 
 
(.034) 
 
  
  NLSY79 (1984-1989)   NLSY97 (2004-2010)   
 
Men Women  Significant Men Women Significant 
Number of Person-years 10,642 8,970 Differences  10,712 11,006 Differences  
 MODEL D (Fixed-Effect) 
        
  
        
  
Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor Supply + 
Spouse work hours  
    
Married .031 
 
-.010     .061 
 
.043 
 
  
 
(.019) 
 
(.028)     (.034) 
 
(.037) 
 
  
Cohabiting .013 
 
.000     .048 
 
.034 
 
  
 
(.019) 
 
(.022)     (.029) 
 
(.032) 
 
  
Divorced .001 
 
.037     .005 
 
.006 
 
  
  (.023)   (.025)     (.047)   (.042)     
Notes: Results presented are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). “Model A” shows OLS 
model’s effect of marital status (never-married as the reference category) on the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for demographic and family 
characteristics. “Model B” shows the effect of marital status (never-married as the reference category) on the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for 
demographic and family characteristics. “Model C” adds controls for human capital and individual labor supply to the controls contained in Model B. "Model D" 
adds controls for spouse work hours to the controls contained in Model C. *Statistically significant differences in means at p < 0.05, where a = significant 
differences by gender within cohort; b = significant differences by cohort among men; and c = significant differences by cohort among women.  
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Table 3. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Breadwinner, Dual-earner, and Men/Women in 
Female/Male-Breadwinner Households with Control Variables on Ln Hourly Wages, By Sex and Cohort (continued onto next page)  
 
 
 
Men 
NLSY79 (1984-1989) N =  10,642 NLSY97 (2004-2010) N = 10,712 
Married Married 
Male-Breadwinner Dual-Earners  Female-Breadwinner Male-Breadwinner Dual-Earners  Female-Breadwinner 
2,345  3,709  670  1,335  1,355  188  
OLS .197 * .161 *** .161 *** .249 * .186 *** -.070 ** 
  (.027) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.048) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.100) 
 
+dem&fam .183 * .146 *** .146 *** .276 ** .193 *** -.065 ** 
  (.027) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.048) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.100) 
 
+HC .168 *** .119 *** .119 *** .238 *** .129 *** -.074 * 
  (.026) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.046) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.102) 
 
FE .047 ** .047 ** .047 ** .058 * .058 * .058 * 
  (.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.016)   (.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
+dem&fam .036 * .036 * .036 * .058 * .058 * .058 * 
  (.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.016)   (.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
+HC .028 
 
.028 
 
.028   .103 * .041 
 
-.068 * 
  (.016)   (.016)   (.016)   (.055)   (.026)   (.074)   
Women 
NLSY79 (1984-1989) N =   8,970 NLSY97 (2004-2010)  N = 11,006 
Married Married 
Male-Breadwinner Dual-Earners  Female-Breadwinner Male-Breadwinner Dual-Earners  Female-Breadwinner 
1,922  4,328  369  922  2,283  226  
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OLS -.060 *** .028 * .028 * -.102 *** .144 *** .232 * 
  (.029) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.044) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.050) 
 
+dem&fam .059 *** .059 *** .059 *** -.030 *** .175 *** .175 *** 
  (.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.044) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013) 
 
+HC .039 *** .039 *** .039 *** -.055 *** .091 *** .091 *** 
  (.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012)   (.045) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013) 
 
FE .035 
 
.035 
 
-.028 * -.060 *** .070 ** .070 ** 
  (.019) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.048)   (.048) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.024) 
 
+dem&fam .029 
 
.029 
 
-.029 * -.052 *** .074 ** .074 ** 
  (.019) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.048)   (.048) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.024) 
 
+HC .025 
 
.025 
 
-.038 * -.076 *** .062 ** .062 ** 
  (.019)   (.019)   (.047)   (.050)   (.024)   (.024)   
Note: Bolded coefficients show the effect is significantly different from dual-earners. Results presented are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p 
< .001 (two-tailed tests). Breadwinners indicate that men or women married to partners who work part-time or not at all or cohabiting with them. Dual-earners indicate that men or women 
married to partners who work full-time or cohabiting with them.  
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Table 4. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Alternate Specifications of Union Status with Higher 
Education Interactions and Control Variables on Ln Earnings, By Sex and Cohort (continued onto next page) 
 
  NLSY79 (1979-1989) NLSY97 (1997-2010) 
 
Men 
High Educ 
Men 
Women 
High Educ 
Women 
Men 
High Educ 
Men 
Women 
High Educ 
Women 
Number of Person-Years 17,269 2,098 13,992 2,650 13,603 2,323 12,061 3,317 
MODEL A (OLS)                                  
Demographic & Family Controls   
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Married .151 *** .151 *** .023 *** .055 * .217 *** .217 *** .111 *** .146 * 
 
(.008) 
 
(.008)   (.007) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.010)   (.009) 
 
(.025) 
 
Cohabiting .030 * .030 * .043 *** .043 *** .075 *** .075 *** .038 *** .038 *** 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013)   (.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.010)   (.009) 
 
(.009) 
 
Divorced .067 *** .067 *** -.005 
 
-.005 
 
.134 *** .134 *** .073 *** .073 *** 
  (.015)   (.015)   (.011)   (.011)   (.026)   (.026)   (.021)   (.021)   
MODEL B (Fixed-Effect)                                 
Demographic & Family Controls   
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Married .061 *** .125 * .018 
 
.087 ** .101 *** .101 *** .013 
 
.098 * 
 
(.010) 
 
(.036)   (.011) 
 
(.036) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.019)   (.019) 
 
(.055) 
 
Cohabiting .035 * .154 * .008 
 
.008 
 
.042 ** .153 * .014 
 
.102 * 
 
(.014) 
 
(.069)   (.015) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.058)   (.015) 
 
(.049) 
 
Divorced .023 
 
.023   .026 
 
.144 * .032 
 
.032   -.012 
 
-.012 
 
  (.017)   (.017)   (.018)   (.069)   (.041)   (.041)   (.036)   (.036)   
 MODEL C (Fixed-Effect)   
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor 
Supply 
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Married .049 *** .049 *** .008 
 
.064 * .096 *** .096 *** .003 
 
.088 * 
 
(.010) 
 
(.010)   (.011) 
 
(.035) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.019)   (.019) 
 
(.055) 
 
Cohabiting .033 * .143 * .006 
 
.006 
 
.045 ** .143 * .009 
 
.097 * 
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(.014) 
 
(.068)   (.015) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.058)   (.015) 
 
(.049) 
 
Divorced .021 
 
.072   .019 
 
.019 
 
.031 
 
.031   -.014 
 
-.014 
 
 
(.017) 
 
(.099)   (.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.041) 
 
(.041)   (.036) 
 
(.036) 
 
 
  NLSY79 (1984-1989) NLSY97 (2004-2010) 
 
Men 
High Educ 
Men 
Women 
High Educ 
Women 
Men 
High Educ 
Men 
Women 
High Educ 
Women 
Number of Person-Years 9,028 1,614 7,039 1,931 8,484 2,228 7,822 3,184 
 MODEL D (Fixed-Effect)   
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor 
Supply + Spouse work hours  
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
Married .023 
 
.023   -.031 
 
.077 ** .046 
 
.046   .021 
 
.021 
 
 
(.020) 
 
(.020)   (.029) 
 
(.064) 
 
(.036) 
 
(.036)   (.040) 
 
(.040) 
 
Cohabiting .003 
 
.003   -.005 
 
-.005 
 
.030 
 
.136 * .002 
 
.004 ** 
 
(.020) 
 
(.020)   (.024) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.029) 
 
(.076)   (.034) 
 
(.067) 
 
Divorced -.006 
 
-.006   .005 
 
.177 ** -.036 
 
.282 * -.007 
 
-.007 
 
  (.024)   (.024)   (.027)   (.091)   (.050)   (.196)   (.046)   (.046)   
Notes:  Results presented are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). “Model A” shows OLS model’s effect of marital status (never-married 
as the reference category) on the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for demographic and family characteristics. “Model B” shows the effect of marital status (never-married as the reference category) on 
the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for demographic and family characteristics. “Model C” adds controls for human capital and individual labor supply to the controls contained in Model B. "Model 
D" adds controls for spouse work hours to the controls contained in Model C. Bolded coefficients show the significant interaction terms. Where interactions are significant, the slopes for each group are 
presented for the union status variables. Where education did not significantly interact with union status variables, the values for education groups (within gender) are the same. 
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Appendix A. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Alternate Specifications of Union Stats and 
Control Variables on Percentile Wage Distributions, By Sex (continued onto next page) 
 
  NLSY79 (1979-1989) NLSY97 (1997-2010) 
 
Men Women  Men Women 
Number of Person-years 19,367 16,642 15,926 15,378 
MODEL A (OLS)  
                
Demographic & Family Controls 
Married 1.026 *** .206 *** 1.245 *** .760 *** 
 
(.051) 
 
(.048)   (.064) 
 
(.056) 
 
Cohabiting .198 * .225 * .387 *** .083 
 
 
(.092) 
 
(.091)   (.061) 
 
(.056) 
 
Divorced .331 *** -.066   .612 *** .096 
 
  (.099)   (.081)   (.175)   (.151)   
MODEL B (Fixed-Effect) 
                
Demographic & Family Controls 
Married .450 *** .140 * .658 *** .328 *** 
 
(.057) 
 
(.058)   (.073) 
 
(.069) 
 
Cohabiting .316 *** .129   .267 *** .196 *** 
 
(.080) 
 
(.078)   (.057) 
 
(.055) 
 
Divorced .188 + .229 * .297 
 
.067 
 
  (.102)   (.094)   (.157)   (.139)   
 MODEL C (Fixed-Effect) 
                
Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor Supply 
Married .331 *** .022   .605 *** .188 ** 
 
(.056) 
 
(.057)   (.072) 
 
(.067) 
 
Cohabiting .259 *** .090   .262 *** .127 * 
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(.079) 
 
(.077)   (.057) 
 
(.053) 
 
Divorced .118 
 
.113   .265 + .029 
 
 
(.100) 
 
(.092)   (.156) 
 
(.136) 
 
 
  NLSY79 (1984-1989) NLSY97 (2004-2010) 
 
Men Women  Men Women 
Number of Person-years 10,642 8,970 10,712 11,006 
 MODEL D (Fixed-Effect) 
                Mod.B + Human Capital & Labor Supply 
+ Spouse work hours  
Married .207 * -.070   .327 * .193 
 
 
(.101) 
 
(.141)   (.140) 
 
(.153) 
 
Cohabiting .043 
 
.031   .143 
 
.196 
 
 
(.102) 
 
(.110)   (.118) 
 
(.132) 
 
Divorced .023 
 
.094   .041 
 
-.068 
 
  (.122)   (.122)   (.195)   (.175)   
Notes: Results presented are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). “Model A” 
shows OLS model’s effect of marital status (never-married as the reference category) on the natural log of hourly earnings, controlling for 
demographic and family characteristics. “Model B” shows the effect of marital status (never-married as the reference category) on the natural log of 
hourly earnings, controlling for demographic and family characteristics. “Model C” adds controls for human capital and individual labor supply to 
the controls contained in Model B. "Model D" adds controls for spouse work hours to the controls contained in Model C.  
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Appendix B. Coefficients and Standard Errors from OLS and Fixed–Effect Models Regressing Breadwinner, Dual-earner, and Men/Women in 
Female/Male-Breadwinner Households with Control Variables on Ln Hourly Wages, By Sex and Cohort (continued onto next page) 
 
Men 
NLSY79 (1984-1989) N =  10,642   NLSY97 (2004-2010) N = 10,712   
Married Cohabiting Married Cohabiting 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
2,345  3,709  670  536  189  45  1,335  1,355  188  1,297  908  176  
OLS .197 * .161 *** .161 *** .072 * .072 * .072 * .249 * .186 *** -.070 ** .089 *** .089 *** .089 *** 
  (.027) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.032)   (.048) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
+dem&fam .183 * .146 *** .146 *** .063 * .063 * .063 * .276 ** .193 *** -.065 ** .094 *** .094 *** .094 *** 
  (.027) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.030)   (.048) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.100) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.018) 
 
+HC .168 *** .119 *** .119 *** .104 *** .104 *** .104 *** .238 *** .129 *** -.074 * .088 *** .088 *** .088 *** 
  (.026) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.029) 
 
(.029) 
 
(.029)   (.046) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.102) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.017) 
 
FE .047 ** .047 ** .047 ** -.010 * .064 * .064 * .058 * .058 * .058 * .046 * .046 * .046 * 
  (.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.057) 
 
(.025) 
 
(.025)   (.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.022) 
 
+dem&fam .036 * .036 * .036 * -.019 * .049 * .049 * .058 * .058 * .058 * .045 * .045 * .045 * 
  (.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.057) 
 
(.025) 
 
(.025)   (.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.022) 
 
+HC .028 
 
.028 
 
.028 
 
-.019 * .049 * .049 * .103 * .041 
 
-.068 * .042 
 
.042 
 
.042 
 
  (.016)   (.016)   (.016)   (.057)   (.025)   (.025)   (.055)   (.026)   (.074)   (.021)   (.021)   (.021)   
Women 
NLSY79 (1984-1989) N =   8,970   NLSY97 (2004-2010)  N = 11,006   
Married Cohabiting Married Cohabiting 
 44 
 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
Male-
Breadwinner 
Dual-
Earners  
Female-
Breadwinner 
1,922  4,328  369  91  178  378  922  2,283  226  502  1,383  314  
OLS -.060 *** .028 * .028 * -.037   -.037 
 
.078 ** -.102 *** .144 *** .232 * -.176 *** .030 
 
-.057 * 
  (.029) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.073)   (.044) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.050) 
 
(.053) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.055) 
 
+dem&fam .059 *** .059 *** .059 *** .007 
 
.007 
 
.007   -.030 *** .175 *** .175 *** -.144 *** .039 * -.037 * 
  (.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.032)   (.044) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.052) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.053) 
 
+HC .039 *** .039 *** .039 *** .037 
 
.037 
 
.037   -.055 *** .091 *** .091 *** -.093 *** .024 
 
.024 
 
  (.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.030)   (.045) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.051) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.016) 
 
FE .035 
 
.035 
 
-.028 * .005 
 
.005 
 
.005   -.060 *** .070 ** .070 ** -.040 ** .051 * .051 * 
  (.019) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.048) 
 
(.028) 
 
(.028) 
 
(.028)   (.048) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.050) 
 
(.020) 
 
(.020) 
 
+dem&fam .029 
 
.029 
 
-.029 * -.003 
 
-.003 
 
-.003   -.052 *** .074 ** .074 ** -.042 ** .048 * .048 * 
  (.019) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.048) 
 
(.028) 
 
(.028) 
 
(.028)   (.048) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.050) 
 
(.020) 
 
(.020) 
 
+HC .025 
 
.025 
 
-.038 * .004 
 
.004 
 
.004   -.076 *** .062 ** .062 ** -.060 *** .041 * .041 * 
  (.019)   (.019)   (.047)   (.028)   (.028)   (.028)   (.050)   (.024)   (.024)   (.051)   (.020)   (.020)   
Note: Bolded coefficients show the effect is significantly different from dual-earners. Results presented are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
(two-tailed tests). Breadwinners indicate that men or women married to partners who work part-time or not at all or cohabiting with them. Dual-earners indicate that men or women married to partners 
who work full-time or cohabiting with them.  
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